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The Power of Home
Remittances to Families and Communities
Leah K. VanWey
Indiana University
The past two decades have seen a rapid increase in the value of 
international migrant remittances; in 2005, their value worldwide con-
servatively was estimated at $167 billion per year (World Bank 2005). 
In many cases, these remittances represent a substantial percentage of 
a migrant-sending country’s income and overshadow the official de-
velopment aid sent from other countries. This has led to research that 
attempts to determine the effects of remittances on economic devel-
opment; it has also led to government efforts to encourage the use of 
remittances for development projects. The body of research is largely 
inconclusive, as some studies show positive effects and some show that 
remittances have no effect or negative effects on development. This 
chapter makes the case that a more complete consideration of the differ-
ent types of migration around the world, and of the role of social institu-
tions in influencing motivations for remittances, can help us understand 
these contradictory findings. I develop a typology of migration-remit-
tance systems based on a consideration of social institutions, and I pres-
ent examples of each type. I conclude with some thoughts about how 
to construct a theory of the process linking migration and remittances 
that will predict the future volume of remittances and their effects on 
economic development.
Past research has focused less on this complete process and more 
on either the motivations of individual migrants or the uses and effects 
of remittances. The literature on remittances in the 1970s and 1980s 
looks at remittances from temporary migrants to their wives, children, 
and parents in their home communities (Dinerman 1978; Reichert 
1981; Rempel and Lobdell 1978; Rubenstein 1992; Weist 1984). The 
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migrants studied were primarily adult male heads of household who 
had left their fellow household members behind in the home communi-
ties. Researchers in this tradition often focused on the ways in which 
remittances were spent. They argued that migration was motivated by 
a lack of employment or a low financial return to agriculture in home 
communities. Migrants left in order to earn money to meet the family’s 
current consumption needs. Therefore, virtually all of the remittances 
were spent on consumption. These studies are largely pessimistic about 
the potential for remittances to contribute to the economic development 
of the home communities. In the words of Joshua Reichert (1981, p. 
64), migration “actually serves to maintain (if not increase) the very 
conditions of underdevelopment, underemployment, and unequal dis-
tribution of capital resources that make migration necessary in the first 
place.”
In contrast, the 1990s and early 2000s saw the expansion of a more 
nuanced approach to remittances, which largely followed the New 
Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) approach to migration (Stark 
1991; Stark and Bloom 1985; Stark and Lucas 1988; Taylor 1992, 1999; 
Taylor, Rozelle, and de Brauw 2003). NELM sees migration as a re-
sponse to market failures in developing countries and remittances as 
part and parcel of the migration process. Migrants leave in large part in 
order to generate remittances for their home households. The remittanc-
es allow the home households to meet consumption needs when other 
income sources fail, and the remittances also provide them with cash 
for large purchases. These remittances thus substitute for insurance, 
smoothing consumption and allowing the home household to undertake 
riskier agricultural endeavors. They substitute as well for credit mar-
kets, allowing the household to make investments that would otherwise 
be impossible. Researchers in this tradition have, in particular, exam-
ined the effects of remittances by considering whole household budgets 
rather than only considering the way the remittances themselves are 
spent. Their research shows that remittances loosen household budget 
constraints, allowing for productive investment as well as increases in 
consumption (Taylor and Wyatt 1996).
Within this tradition, research has also challenged the pessimistic 
view of the effects of remittances that are spent on consumption (Durand 
et al. 1996; Durand, Parrado, and Massey 1996; Massey and Parrado 
1994). Migrant-sending households use some of the remittances that 
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are spent on consumption for purchase of local and regional products 
and services. This spending then drives local and regional economic 
growth by increasing demand for products and services. Estimates 
of the multiplier effect of remittances—the amount that the economy 
grows as a result of each dollar remitted—show the importance of re-
mittances for economic growth in migrant-sending countries (Taylor 
1999; Taylor et al. 1996; World Bank 2005). However, the effect of 
remittances on home communities is less clear, as it depends on how 
much of the spending of remittances goes for consumer goods from 
elsewhere in the country or from the migration destinations.
At the same time, other researchers were focusing on individual 
motivations for remittances, generally within a framework of com-
paring altruistic motivations to contractual (or exchange) motivations 
(Agarwal and Horowitz 2002; Hoddinott 1994; Lucas and Stark 1985; 
Secondi 1997; Stark 1999; Stark and Lucas 1988; VanWey 2004). This 
research finds that remittance (and migration) patterns vary with the 
individual characteristics of the migrant. The gender of the migrant, for 
instance, has important implications for how much and what type of 
remittance is sent (Curran and Rivero-Fuentes 2003; de la Brière et al. 
2002; Osaki 1999; Semyonov and Gorodzeisky 2005; VanWey 2004). 
The length of migration (Brown 1998) and the age and marital status of 
the migrant also significantly affect the propensity to remit. While these 
and other studies take the NELM approach of examining the reasons 
for the decision to migrate, they also pay attention to the social and cul-
tural context in order to understand who remits, when, and how much. 
Social networks affect both the pressure to remit and the ability to remit 
(Roberts and Morris 2003), while social norms influence the expecta-
tion by the migrant and the family that a particular type of migrant will 
remit (Osaki 1999; VanWey 2004). This research also generates debate, 
in this case about the motivations for remittances. Some studies find 
support for altruistic motivations, while others find only support for 
exchange motivations.
Since approximately the turn of the century researchers have been 
examining a relatively new form of remittance, sometimes called “col-
lective remittances” (Goldring 2004) and sometimes called “social re-
mittances” (Alarcon 2002). These are remittances collected by a group 
of migrants in a shared destination and returned to their home com-
munity for some sort of community project. These projects include 
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social events (such as rodeos and festivals honoring patron saints), 
infrastructure projects (paving roads, constructing or repairing build-
ings, installing sewer service), and scholarships for schoolchildren 
(DeSipio 2002). These have been most extensively studied in modern-
day Mexico (Goldring 2004), but this form of remittance is also found 
in other countries and other eras (Foner 2000; Mohan 2002; Mohan and 
Zack-Williams 2002).
There are inconsistent findings about the causes and consequences 
of this form of remittance as well. Cohen (2001) argues that migrants 
provide these remittances in order to improve their social status in the 
home community and not out of any altruistic motive. Others contend 
that migrants are motivated by a concern for the welfare of their home 
community and by a desire to give back to the community (de la Garza 
and Lowell 2002). The Mexican government is banking on the sec-
ond motivation and is encouraging migrants to act on it even more: the 
government has begun a policy of providing matching funds for remit-
tances sent back for community projects. 
Even more vigorously debated is the effect of these projects on 
community development. Binford (2003) argues that these community 
projects do not always benefit the whole community, and that often the 
projects are social in nature and thus have no lasting impact on the com-
munity. At the same time, others hold that these projects have positive 
effects on their own and that they build capacity in the communities. By 
organizing to complete a project, particularly one that requires interact-
ing with the government to get matching funds, communities develop 
organizational skills that were not present previously (Díaz-Briquets 
and Pérez-López 1997; Vertovec 2004).
This chapter seeks to understand the reasons for some of the varia-
tion in results researchers have found concerning the motivations of 
migrants to remit and the effects of remittances on economic develop-
ment. I argue that social institutions in the home community and the 
institutionalization of the migration process have important effects on 
the economic actions of individual migrants. Migration and remittance 
have traditionally been considered to be individual decisions, motivated 
by economic concerns. Most simply put, individuals move to places 
where they expect to make the most money over the long term (Massey 
and García España 1987; Todaro 1969). Remittances belie the focus on 
individuals by showing that migration can be a household or a family 
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decision (Stark and Lucas 1988). However, this focus on individuals 
versus households, with some additional consideration of economic 
context, has led to contradictory arguments about motivations for re-
mittances, about the levels of remittances to be expected, and about the 
effects of remittances on development. Given the particular importance 
of social institutions in influencing gendered family roles and migra-
tion (described in the next section), I propose a typology of migration- 
remittance systems that have distinct underlying rationales and effects 
on economic development in the home community. In this chapter, I 
argue that a more careful consideration of the type of migrants com-
ing from a community (a factor that is based in some part on how well 
developed migration streams are), and of the social institutions in that 
community, will clarify some of the contradictions.
THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
All migrants are someone’s child, spouse, or parent. The organization 
of the family and the expectations of individuals filling various roles in 
the family influence both migration and remittances. The expectations 
regarding the behavior of individuals in various roles (parent, child, 
spouse) are also determined by the gender expectations of the commu-
nity (or country). The combination of gender and family position deter-
mines both the ability of an individual to migrate and the expectations 
of support from any given individual to various others in the family. For 
example, in many countries social rules indicate that unmarried daugh-
ters cannot work (or sometimes even travel) outside the home without 
supervision by fathers or other male relatives. Often, social rules dictate 
that one spouse cares for the home while the other provides financial or 
subsistence support. Similarly, societies vary in the extent to which un-
married children old enough to migrate are expected to contribute do-
mestic work or income to their parents’ household. Flows of money and 
other forms of support from parents to married children or vice versa 
are also structured by social norms, and strong norms of filial support 
for aging parents are common in many high-migration societies. Such 
norms are also gendered: social norms often indicate that support for 
parents is provided by one particular child (e.g., the youngest daughter, 
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the oldest son) or by one gender of child. Research shows that this often 
leads to differential investment by parents, as parents give more support 
to the child who is expected to later support them.
The institutions developed around the migration process itself also 
have important implications for understanding remittances. As migra-
tion becomes more common in a community, the process becomes insti-
tutionalized, with widely known procedures and widespread opportuni-
ty for migration (Massey 1990; Massey et al. 1994). This leads both to 
expansion of opportunity to migrate regardless of differences in wealth 
and education and to more organization of migrants in the destination 
areas. As the migration stream focuses on one or a few destinations and 
the population of migrants from a common home community and hav-
ing common experiences grows, migrants in destinations form organi-
zations based on common home communities (hometown associations). 
These associations then partially structure the way in which migrants 
interact with their home communities, affecting the types, amounts, and 
uses of remittances that they send.
A TYPOLOGY OF MIGRATION-REMITTANCE SYSTEMS
Because of the importance of the roles that migrants or potential 
migrants play in their families, the typology I propose here focuses in 
part on the changing types of migrants in terms of their family statuses. 
The first type of migration-remittance system is a system in which the 
majority of migrants are male heads of household, the traditional bread-
winners in most migrant-sending societies. The second type of system 
is one in which the majority of migrants are young adults leaving their 
parents’ home to migrate before they have begun to form their own 
families. The third is a system in which migration is widespread among 
most types of people in a community. In this type, migration is common 
enough that hometown associations have formed in the destination, and 
exchanges of people, ideas, and money between home and destination 
are common. In this next section, I describe the underlying logic of the 
migration and remittance decisions for each type and then provide an 
example of each system from past research.
The Power of Home: Remittances to Families and Communities   129
Migrant Male Heads of Household
The early research on international migrants and their remittances, 
based largely on international migration from Mexico to the United 
States, argued that men were leaving their wives and children in their 
home communities in order to earn money to support them (Dinerman 
1978; Massey et al. 1987; Reichert 1981; Weist 1984). These migrants 
were characterized as target earners who came to the United States to 
earn money because of a shortage of well-paying jobs in their home 
communities. Once they earned the target amount—whether it be for 
consumption for the next year, for a house, or for a piece of land—they 
returned to their families. The logic underlying this type of migration 
and remittance is simple: men in migrant-sending regions are unable to 
earn enough money to start a family (which involves the purchase of 
materials to build a house and the purchase of a piece of land to begin 
farming) or to continue supporting their family (either through earning 
a regular income or by investing in a new business or improvements to 
their farm). 
Migration is an attractive alternative because of the large amounts 
(relative to the incomes in the home community) that can be earned 
in relatively short periods of time. Migration becomes most attractive 
when wages are low or unemployment is high in the home community 
(Todaro 1969), but it also springs from a failure in certain key economic 
markets (Stark and Bloom 1985). In particular, most migrant-sending 
regions have no functional credit or insurance markets. Couples can-
not buy a house on credit when they get married; they must have the 
money in hand. Similarly, new farm machinery or inventory for a new 
small business must be purchased with cash. Insurance against high 
health care costs, the failure of crops, and unexpected unemployment is 
similarly unavailable, making families vulnerable to a dramatic decline 
in standard of living following these events. To overcome these market 
failures, to get cash for planned or unplanned expenses, men migrate for 
short periods to earn specified amounts of money.
The reasoning (based on the migrant’s gender-specific role in the 
family) that motivates these men to both migrate and send (or bring) 
remittances to their homes is the same reasoning that motivates them to 
get any sort of job and spend the income on family needs. In Mexico, 
the majority of migrants have traditionally been men because of norms 
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about appropriate behavior for men and women. Men are expected to 
support their families by working outside the home and bringing home 
income. Thus, men not only are expected to earn income, but they have 
greater freedom of movement outside of the home, making them the 
clear choice for migration. Following this logic, it is also a foregone 
conclusion that men will send or bring money home. They migrate 
solely for the purpose of earning money, and they will be viewed as 
having failed to support their families if they are not able to send or 
bring money home.
Massey and colleagues provide clear descriptions of this type of mi-
gration from four communities in western Mexico in their book Return 
to Aztlán (Massey et al. 1987) and in later works (Durand, Parrado, and 
Massey 1996; Massey and Parrado 1994; Parrado 2004). They show 
that the lifetime probability of migration is very high for men in their 
study communities, the result of a predictable pattern of migration over 
the lives of these men. Massey et al. (1987, p. 200) find that “active mi-
gration begins at a high level among young unmarried men, falls after 
marriage, rises with the arrival of children, and then falls again as the 
children mature and leave home. In short, over the course of a man’s 
life cycle, active migration rises and falls depending on family needs, 
while the number with migrant experience steadily grows.”
The level of migration varies from community to community, de-
pending on economic conditions, but the pattern over the life cycle 
holds across communities. Parrado (2004) finds that getting the money 
necessary to set up an independent household is a strong motivator for 
migration among young men. Massey and Parrado (1994) also find high 
rates of remitting among migrant household heads (as opposed to un-
married migrants). Using an updated set of survey data covering 22 
communities, they estimate that 73 percent of household heads remit-
ted during their last trip to the United States (p. 11), while 58 percent 
brought money back when they returned (p. 14).
Migrant Children
The second type of migration and remittance in my typology in-
volves the migration of adult children out of their parents’ households 
and their home communities. Like the first type, these moves are often 
planned as temporary moves, in which children come to work in urban 
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areas or international destinations for a short period of time between 
stopping school and marrying. Thus the money that they send back is 
sent to their parents rather than to spouses or children. This type of mi-
gration has been extensively studied in Southeast Asia (Elmhirst 2002; 
Lauby and Stark 1988; Osaki 1999; Trager 1988; VanWey 2004) and in 
Africa (Hoddinott 1994; Lucas and Stark 1985; Oberai and Singh 1980; 
Stark and Lucas 1988), and it forms the basis for most of the theorizing 
about the motivations of individuals to remit.
This type of migration decision follows a different logic from that 
of the decision of male household heads. Theorists have argued that 
the decision for these children to migrate is at least partly a household 
decision, in which parents allocate themselves and their still-dependent 
children to local or nonlocal employment in order to minimize risk and 
smooth consumption (Massey et al. 1993; Stark and Lucas 1988). Thus 
the expectation of remittances on the part of the home household is 
an integral part of the migration decision. The home households are 
generally in areas where they face imperfectly functioning or absent 
markets, leading to a lack of affordable credit and to a lack of insurance 
against crop failures or price fluctuations. By being employed off-farm, 
migrants provide much-needed cash income for a variety of household 
purchases. Migration also provides good insurance against income 
shortfalls because migrants are generally in a geographic region or a 
sector of the economy providing income that does not covary with the 
income of the home household. For example, the failure of a rice crop 
in a migrant-sending region of rural Thailand is generally unrelated to 
the income earned by a migrant working in construction in Bangkok. If 
the crop fails or rice prices drop and the home household cannot meet 
consumption needs, the migrant will still have income that can be used 
to support the family.
Even though home households send migrants with the expectation 
of remittances to meet the needs of all household members, the results 
of empirical studies of this type of migrant show that, at the same time, 
migrants are self-interested actors (Hoddinott 1994; Lucas and Stark 
1985; Stark and Lucas 1988). Migration is important to young adults 
for improving skills and long-term earning potential, and for meeting 
new people and seeing new places. It can also be a way for migrants 
to escape the control of their parents and home communities. Thus the 
remittances that households receive from these migrants are not com-
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pletely unselfish. Research shows that home households and migrants 
engage in informal bargaining, with migrants remitting more to the ex-
tent that they expect to benefit more from their relationships with their 
home households.
The findings on remittances among these young adult migrants 
closely mirror general studies and theories of intergenerational transfers 
in the developing world. As in much of the literature on remittances, the 
intergenerational transfers literature distinguishes between altruistic mo-
tivations on the part of children for supporting their parents (considering 
the parents’ needs and sending support in response to those needs) and 
exchange motivations, in which the transfers between generations are 
part of a bargain that benefits both children and parents (Frankenberg, 
Lillard, and Willis 2002; Lee, Parish, and Willis 1994; Lillard and Willis 
1997; Quisumbing 1994). The support for altruistic motivations for re-
mittances is relatively weak and shows that the “altruistic” behavior 
of children is structured by social norms regarding filial responsibil-
ity—children that are expected to care for their aging parents are more 
likely to behave altruistically than are other children. The literature on 
remittances also shows clear self-interested behavior on the part of mi-
grants who are children of aging parents: they remit more when they 
expect to return to their home communities (Roberts and Morris 2003; 
Sana 2005) or when their parents have more land that they may leave to 
their children in the future (Hoddinott 1994; VanWey 2004).
My work on migrants from villages in rural Thailand provides a 
good example of this type of remittance (VanWey 2004). This study ex-
amines migrants from a sample of villages in Nang Rong district, in the 
Northeast of Thailand. The majority of the migrants are children leav-
ing their parents’ home to migrate to other rural areas, to Bangkok, or 
to export-oriented manufacturing areas in the Eastern Seaboard of the 
country. I examine data from a 1994 follow-up survey, in which infor-
mation was collected from each household about remittances over the 
previous year from migrants who left the household between an earlier 
interview (in 1984) and 1994. The relationships between migrants and 
their home households are characterized by remittances in both direc-
tions, but migrants send money or goods home more often than home 
households send money or goods to migrants. Figure 7.1 shows that 
home households send some sort of remittance (money or goods) to just 
under 20 percent of migrants, while more than half of male migrants 
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and two-thirds of female migrants send some sort of remittance to their 
home households.
From this figure we can see the gender differences in the probability 
of remitting: women are much more likely to remit. Using multivariate 
statistical models, I further explored the different determinants of remit-
tances for male and female migrants. I found that both male and female 
migrants were remitting in ways that suggested self-interested behavior. 
The more land the home household owned (and therefore could leave to 
the migrant in the future), the more likely an individual migrant was to 
send remittances—but only when there were many other migrants from 
the same household. The migrants were competing with each other for 
the inheritance. However, female migrants were also acting in a way 
that suggested altruism, by remitting at higher rates when their parents 
were in the home household (as they were in most cases). They were 
substantially more likely to be supporting those parents than were their 
brothers.










Households Male migrants Female migrants
SOURCE: Author’s calculations, based on data from the Nang Rong Projects (Univer-
sity of North Carolina 2005).
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To test whether the differences between male and female migrants 
in their overall rates of remitting were due to gender differences in 
things like jobs or wealth of home households, or to differences in how 
males and females made decisions based on jobs or wealth or the needs 
of parents, I conducted a simulation analysis. I looked at what would 
happen if men were like women, both in variables like age, occupation, 
and education and in the characteristics of the households they left. I 
then looked at what would happen if each gender had its true values in 
these characteristics but behaved like the other gender. For example, 
what if men had the same jobs or education but these characteristics 
affected them in the way that they affected women? Figure 7.2 shows 
the results of this analysis. The baseline difference between men and 
women in remitting (shown in Figure 7.1) is due to differences in how 
male and female migrants respond to various characteristics, primarily 
to the presence of their parents in the home household. Even if men 




























SOURCE: Author’s calculations, based on data from the Nang Rong Projects (Univer-
sity of North Carolina 2005).
Figure 7.2  Predicted Probability of Male and Female Migrants 
Remitting, Nang Rong, Thailand, 1994
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at the same rate as women. For that result to occur, they would have to 
behave like women (bar B). Similarly, if women behaved like men (bar 
C), they would remit less than they actually do (bar D).
These results show that migrants are behaving as we would expect 
from the literature on intergenerational transfers and relationships. They 
are bargaining (implicitly) with their parents and siblings for future in-
heritance of land, and daughters are fulfilling socially expected support 
roles. In the Thai context, filial support is structured by the tenets of 
Theravada Buddhism, which say that children must earn religious merit 
on behalf of their parents to repay the parents for giving them life. Sons 
are able to do this by spending a short period (about 3 months) becom-
ing ordained monks during early adulthood, while daughters primar-
ily earn religious merit by caring for their families. Thus, daughters 
who migrate pay this debt through remittances while sons have no such 
obligation.
Collective Remittances
While some anthropologists and others have noted the importance 
of associations of migrants in destinations for migrant adaptation to 
the destination community, and for economic development projects in 
their home communities (Hirabayashi 1986), widespread study of the 
remittances from these groups to their home communities has only re-
cently begun (Alarcon 2002). This interest results from the dramatic 
increase in the value of these remittances as international remittances 
have grown in volume, and from the Mexican government’s attempt 
to capture some of these remittances for infrastructure projects and 
other development needs in home communities. Federal, state, and lo-
cal governments in Mexico now provide matching funds (the amount 
varies across the country but is usually a 100 or 200 percent match of 
funds sent by migrant associations). This type of remittance becomes 
more common as the size of the population of migrants from a given 
hometown (or home region) in a destination grows. Migrant groups are 
formed to aid migrants with adaptation and employment in the destina-
tion and for social reasons. These groups then collect money to send 
home to their home communities for parties, infrastructure projects, or 
other community needs. The extent to which the projects are initiated 
or controlled by the home communities versus the migrant associations 
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varies from community to community and is itself a function of institu-
tions in the home community, as we will see in the example presented 
below.
In this setting, the motivations for migration are similar to the pre-
vious cases, where migrants leave to earn more money and to over-
come the lack of credit and insurance in home communities. However, 
the longer history and institutionalization of migration has several im-
pacts. The increasing participation of community members in migration 
leads to migration being a less difficult choice. Migration costs less both 
financially and psychologically because of three accumulative factors: 
1) the ease of finding employment through friends, family, or the home-
town association; 2) the familiarity of the people the migrant will find 
in the destination; and 3) the number of people going back and forth. 
Migrants now include not only spouses or children but entire nuclear 
families. The hometown associations and organizations associated with 
the migration process facilitate the migration and increase the affinity 
that migrants have for home communities even in the absence of im-
mediate family in the home community.
Remittances then take on a different set of motivations. Collective 
remittances are fundamentally a social process, as they are collected 
by an organization in the destination and sent for projects that benefit 
more than one family in the home community. While migrants still send 
money to their spouses or parents, they also send money through the 
hometown associations for the betterment of the home community. The 
hometown association’s stated motivation for this type of remittance 
is care for the home community and a desire to improve the lives of 
those remaining there. However, studies also show that the set of social 
relationships among and between migrant and nonmigrant community 
members structures remittance behavior. Migrants remit to increase 
their social status among migrants and nonmigrants alike; indeed, the 
dense network of social ties between migrants and nonmigrants in this 
type of migration stream ensures that information is quickly transmitted 
between these groups. Migrants also remit in order to increase the status 
and access to resources of their extended family in the home commu-
nity (Osili 2004), and in order to ensure their continued membership in 
the community, which is called the option to return (Roberts and Morris 
2003).
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An example of this type of remittance comes from a study that 
VanWey, Tucker, and McConnell (2005) completed on remittances to 
four communities in the central valleys of the state of Oaxaca, Mexico. 
These communities are unusual for Mexico (though not for Oaxaca) 
in their system of governance. The four communities are all managed 
under a system called usos y costumbres, by which natural resources 
are communally owned and all adult male community members have a 
responsibility for the management of these resources and for the gover-
nance of the community. They contribute their labor for the maintenance 
of communal resources (and community infrastructure) in the form of 
workdays called tequio and must on a regular basis assume positions in 
community government, called cargos, for a few years at a time. These 
traditional (based on indigenous systems) governance institutions struc-
ture the collective remittances received by these communities.
Migrants from these communities are usually men traveling alone 
or in groups (often leaving their wives and children in the home com-
munity) or nuclear families traveling together. Within Mexico, migrants 
mostly travel to Oaxaca City or to Mexico City; in the United States, 
they mostly travel to southern California. They migrate largely to ob-
tain better-paying jobs in migration destinations, with the goal of im-
proving their own and their families’ standards of living. Virtually all 
of the migrants remit some money to family members, presumably for 
the reasons described above (though we did not study this). However, 
in some of the communities they also send money for missed tequios, 
for community festivals, and for development projects initiated by the 
origin community.
The primary motivation of these migrants for remitting is a desire 
to maintain their position and membership in the home community. The 
obligation to remit is framed as both a moral responsibility and a prac-
tical way to avoid adverse consequences for one’s remaining family 
members. As a respondent in Sierra Alta notes, “Supposedly it [paying 
for missed tequios] is voluntary, so it isn’t obligatory. More than any-
thing, people here are very conscientious . . . We aren’t obligated, but 
the majority of the migrants would feel bad to come back and not give 
something . . . So it’s really a moral issue.”
The home community also uses the threat of restricting access to 
services or to the benefits of communally owned resources to encour-
age payment. The president of the Committee on Communal Resources 
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in San Timoteo, one of our study communities, reported, “In the end, 
what the municipio opts to do is to await the moment in which it can lay 
down the law. That moment comes when someone needs [the services 
of] the commission. For example, someone says, ‘You have to put in a 
water line.’ Well, we’re going to do it, but [I reply], ‘If you want water, 
then you owe me five tequios that are worth this much, so you have to 
pay that much.’ And that’s how we do it.”
This motivation explains the variation in the levels of remittance 
we see sent to the different study communities. Table 7.1 shows the 
results of our analyses of interview transcripts. The communities that 
were more strongly organized under the usos y costumbres system, 
with more clearly delineated responsibilities and strictly enforced fines, 
also received more remittances from migrants. This was unrelated to 
whether the migrants had gone to other parts of Mexico or to the United 
States. Thus, stronger community institutions mean that the migrants 
must remit in order to maintain their community membership and the 
option of returning to the community.
THE POWER OF HOME AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
These examples all show the importance of social institutions in 
the home community and the home country in structuring the decisions 
of migrants about remittances. That is to say, they all show the pow-
er of home over migrants. The rights and responsibilities of men and 
SOURCE: Adapted from VanWey, Tucker, and McConnell (2005).
Table 7.1  Strength of Institutions, Migration, and Remittances for Study 
Communities, Oaxaca, Mexico, 2002
Community
Strength of 
institutions Migration to U.S.
Remittances to 
community
Sierra Alta High Low High
San Matias High High High
Cerro Verde Intermediate Low Low
San Timoteo Low High Low
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women, parents and children, determine their opportunities for migra-
tion and the amount and reasons they remit. The political institutions 
in the home community determine the obligations that the migrant has 
to the home community in order to guarantee the social standing of the 
remaining family members and his or her own option for return. What 
initially appears as an economic decision requires a consideration of 
social institutions.
Given this, migration researchers need to account for these institu-
tions in order to understand empirical results regarding the processes 
of migration and remittance. Beyond that, we need to theorize on the 
importance of social institutions. I have provided here a basic typology 
from my work and that of others, but further theoretical work needs to 
be done to develop the relationship that exists between migration, re-
mittances, and a variety of social institutions, in order to move beyond 
an after-the-fact interpretation of results as showing the institutional ef-
fects. This theoretical development will also show whether these three 
categories of migration and remittance systems show the complete vari-
ability, or whether additional categories are needed. Furthermore, it will 
allow us to develop and test hypotheses about the transition from one 
migration-remittance system to another.
Understanding the effects of institutions and the type of migration 
will allow us to understand and predict the effects of remittances on 
economic development. The first type of migration and remittance (mi-
grant male household heads) is essential for the well-being of families 
in migrant-sending communities. However, it has a debatable impact 
on economic development in sending communities. Many studies show 
that the vast majority of the money brought home by these men, or sent 
home to similar communities, is spent on current expenses or homes 
(considered consumption expenses rather than productive investments). 
Yet a review of studies by Taylor (1999) argues that even money spent 
on consumption will have positive effects on the economy. Remittances 
spent on consumption free up other resources for productive invest-
ment, according to studies of the effects of remittances on all types of 
spending by households. Additionally, remittances spent on consump-
tion in local communities represent a sizable amount of money and can 
drive economic growth by increasing demand for locally or regional-
ly produced goods and services (Durand, Parrado, and Massey 1996; 
Taylor 1999; World Bank 2005).
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Remittances that are intergenerational transfers from migrant chil-
dren to their parents have mixed implications for economic develop-
ment. They go to parents to support their needs but are likely to come 
at a time when the parents are not making investments in new land, 
new technology, or other sorts of capital. The immediate use of these 
remittances is more likely to be for consumption, but again this might 
have multiplier effects. Thus, this type of remittance has the potential 
to bring about economic growth as long as it lasts. The long-term im-
pacts are limited by the lack of productive investment (meaning that the 
remittances will not have long-term payoffs) and by the time-limited 
nature of the remittances. Remittances that are used to support parents 
will obviously not outlast the lives of the parents.
Collective remittances have the most immediate potential for posi-
tively affecting economic development. These monies can be used to 
invest in infrastructure (roads, electricity, schools, sanitation, etc.) that 
will improve the health and productivity of community residents and 
potentially allow them to develop or attract businesses. While some 
past research has suggested that collective remittances do not fund proj-
ects desired by the home community (as opposed to projects desired by 
the migrants), our study shows that home communities can initiate proj-
ects and obtain money for them from migrants. In communities such as 
our study communities, the money can be (and has been) invested in 
community enterprises that bring additional income and employment to 
community residents. In this way, remittances might be able to improve 
home communities to such an extent that future migration would be less 
desirable.
Further theoretical as well as empirical development of this mi-
gration-remittance system typology will allow researchers to predict 
the future volume and effects of remittances on home communities. If 
communities move in a rough progression from male heads of house-
hold being pioneer migrants to children migrating in a fully developed 
multilocal social field that includes hometown associations and an in-
stitutionalized migration process, we can then predict a progression of 
effects on local economic development. Initially this progression will 
be characterized by relatively low levels of remittances (because of the 
small number of migrants), and these remittances will be used for both 
consumption and investment by nuclear families who are still rooted in 
the community. These remittances not only will have multiplier effects 
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because of consumption spending, but they will directly increase pro-
ductivity by allowing investments of various types. Subsequent to this, 
remittances to parents will be used primarily for consumption and will 
only last as long as the parents are living and the children are obligated 
to support them (for example, they might stop when the children them-
selves marry or have children). The economic effects of these remit-
tances will occur primarily through consumption spending and multi-
plier effects. The volume of these remittances may also be higher, given 
the larger number of migrants participating in the migration stream over 
time. Finally, the remittances within the fully developed system bypass 
(or supplement) remittances to families in their economic effects. The 
fundamental change at this stage in the progression is that the remit-
tances support the production of public goods, which benefits families 
with and without migrants. This type of remittance has the possibility of 
eventually evening the standards of living and the life chances of these 
two groups.
Note
Parts of this chapter are based on empirical work conducted with Catherine Tucker and 
Eileen McConnell, funded in part by the Center for the Study of Institutions, Popula-
tion, and Environmental Change and by the College of Arts and Sciences at Indiana 
University. Other parts are based on dissertation work conducted with support from the 
Carolina Population Center at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (through 
a National Institute for Child Health and Human Development training grant). The 
author also thanks Jorge Chapa, Dennis Conway, Richard Jones, Enrico Marcelli, Una 
Osili, Susan Pozo, and participants in a miniconference on transnational connectedness 
at Indiana University, April 2006, for comments on earlier versions of this work.
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